The Great Scramble

As 2025 draws to a close, it is worth stepping back from individual crises and looking at the geopolitical map as a whole. What emerges is not chaos, but a new pattern. The old certainties are weakening, yet the world is not dissolving into disorder. Instead, power is reorganising itself around new coalitions, built by states that no longer assume a permanent protector.

The global pillars remain unchanged. The United States, China, and Russia continue to define the upper structure of the system. India remains a special case. It is a pillar in capacity, but not yet in conduct. It avoids binding commitments, prefers optionality, and remains strategically non-aligned. That position will not last forever, but it still defines India’s floater role today.

What changed in 2025 was not the identity of the pillars, but the behaviour of the states beneath them.

Three Structural Trends of 2025

The first trend is the widening rupture between the United States and Europe. This is visible both economically and strategically. Tariff disputes, industrial competition, and divergent approaches to security have made clear that the transatlantic relationship is no longer a default alignment. On the security side, uncertainty around NATO commitments has become structural rather than rhetorical. If J.D. Vance wins in 2028, this gap will widen further. His worldview is explicitly post-Atlantic. The liberal globalist era is ending. Power politics has returned, and Europe is no longer confident that Washington will always be there when needed.

The second trend is the hard crystallisation of the break between Europe and Russia. What began as tension has become separation. Energy ties have been severed. Cultural and political links are eroding. The long Russian journey toward Europe that began with Peter the Great after the Great Northern War is coming to a definitive halt. Three centuries of westward orientation are ending. The pivot east will take time, but the relationship with the European Union is entering a long period of hostility and mistrust. Individual European states may still engage Russia directly, but the continental relationship is broken for decades.

The third trend is the erosion of confidence in the American nuclear umbrella. Across 2025, open discussion of national nuclear options has moved from taboo to policy debate. Poland, Japan, and South Korea are now speaking openly about deterrence autonomy. Saudi Arabia has moved closer to Pakistan as an insurance policy. This does not mean proliferation is inevitable, but it does mean the psychological foundation of non-proliferation is weakening. That is dangerous for all three pillars.

The Emergence of Middle-Power Coalitions

Against this background, middle powers are no longer waiting. They are building.

In the Mediterranean and Red Sea space, a coalition has formed between the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus. This MEDRED grouping operates under an American umbrella, but functions independently. It is a technology and security axis, primarily oriented against Turkish expansionism. It is solid because each member brings assets the others cannot replace. Egypt participates as a floating member.

Opposite this stands TAP, the alignment between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan. This bloc has no dominant pillar. It is civilizational, disruptive, and ambitious. Turkey leans toward the West when useful, Pakistan toward China when necessary, but the bloc is held together by shared objectives and shared rivals. For example, TAP and Russia are tactical partners today, existential enemies tomorrow. TAP is likely to endure. Qatar participates as an important floating member.

In Northern Europe, the BALRING (Baltic Ring) has emerged as an existential security league. Germany, Poland, the Nordic states, and the Baltic countries have formed a tightly integrated military and strategic grouping under an American umbrella. This is not merely NATO in miniature. It is a bloc within NATO, driven by fear of Russia. Poland’s presence here is permanent. Its hostility toward Russia overrides any ambition to lead an alternative Central European grouping.

Southern and Western Europe display a looser formation, which can be described as LATCAT. Informal leader France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium form a relaxed political bloc within the EU. These states do not see Russia as an immediate threat and spend accordingly. They are large enough to resist absorption into harder security groupings, yet too fragmented to form a true alternative centre of power.

Central Europe presents a different pattern. Hungary, Slovakia, and Czechia form what can be called the POSTHAB (Post-Habsburg bloc). There is no formal leader, though Hungary functions as primus inter pares given Orbán's direct access to all three pillars. Austria remains outside formally but shares the grouping's orientation. This grouping is sovereigntist, pragmatic, and open to engagement with Russia. Serbia is likely to associate more closely. This bloc is stable because it reflects a shared strategic culture shaped by history and reinforced by ideology.

In Central Asia, the C5 has become unavoidable. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan increasingly act as a unit. Geography forces cooperation. Russia remains the dominant security pillar, with China playing a secondary economic role. The growing number of C5 summits (USA, EU, Japan, S Korea showing interest) reflects recognition that unity is the only viable strategy.

Situational Alliances and Floaters

Not all alignments are durable. The QUAD remains a consultative forum rather than a true alliance. Its members share concerns about China, but are deeply integrated with China economically. It will not hold under real pressure.

Some relationships are purely transactional. Azerbaijan and Israel is one example. It will fracture the moment Turkey demands a choice.

Then there are the floaters. The United Kingdom has chosen its side. It is the offshore patron of the BALRING, providing intelligence, naval power, and strategic depth. It remains a significant middle power, even as its domestic trajectory weakens.

Poland remains psychologically conflicted. Militarily anchored in the BALRING, it dreams of leading Central Eastern Europe, but lacks the scale to do so. Its fate is to be a frustrated but indispensable frontline state.

Saudi Arabia is the ultimate floater. It has cold/hot relations with members of both MEDRED and TAP, courts Washington, maintains links to Beijing and Moscow. Its objective is not alignment, but leadership of the Muslim world. Qatar operates similarly, though from a position of vulnerability rather than ambition. Egypt remains a client state for now, though its demographic and geographic weight could change that over time.

Africa and Latin America remain largely outside durable coalition structures. They are theatres of extraction, not actors with agency. That will not change soon.

Final Thoughts

The end of 2025 does not mark the collapse of the global system. It marks its reassembly. The age of guaranteed protection is over. In its place emerges a world of coalitions built on fear, identity, and geography. The middle powers are no longer waiting. They are building.

This is where the world stands. And this is where we leave it.